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Abstract 
 
The UK Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) funded project “Meeting 
the Design Challenges of nanoCMOS Electronics” 
(nanoCMOS) is developing a research infrastructure 
for collaborative electronics research across multiple 
institutions in the UK with especially strong industrial 
and commercial involvement. Unlike other domains, 
the electronics industry is driven by the necessity of 
protecting the intellectual property of the data, designs 
and software associated with next generation 
electronics devices and therefore requires fine-grained 
security. Similarly, the project also demands seamless 
access to large scale high performance compute 
resources for atomic scale device simulations and the 
capability to manage the hundreds of thousands of files 
and the metadata associated with these simulations. 
Within this context, the project has explored a wide 
range of authentication and authorization 
infrastructures facilitating compute resource access 
and providing fine-grained security over numerous 
distributed file stores and files. We conclude that no 
single security solution meets the needs of the project. 
This paper describes the experiences of applying 
X.509-based certificates and public key 
infrastructures, VOMS, PERMIS, Kerberos and the 
Internet2 Shibboleth technologies for nanoCMOS 
security. We outline how we are integrating these 
solutions to provide a complete end-to-end security 
framework meeting the demands of the nanoCMOS 
electronics domain.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The constantly decreasing scaling of transistors in 
complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) 
integrated circuits has fuelled the phenomenal growth 
and success of the global semiconductor industry. This 
has been well captured over the past 40 years by 
Moore’s law [1]. However, the International Roadmap 
for Semiconductors (ITRS) [2] is nearing the limits of 
physical scaling with sub-10nm transistor dimensions 
scheduled for mass production in 2016. With the 
dimensions of a typical transistor in current processor 
technologies at 65nm, the race is on between major 
semiconductor manufacturers to demonstrate that they 
are capable of manufacturing devices with such nano-
scale dimensions.  
Taking on the scaling challenge demands that the 
fundamental discreteness of charge and matter, at these 
scales, must be considered and integrated into the 
entire electronics design process. There are at present 
no integrated methodologies that can capture the full 
complexity of this problem and allow the accurate 
prediction of both the characteristics and scale of these 
intrinsic fluctuations in transistor performance and 
power consumption, and their subsequent impact on 
the performance of circuits and systems. Rather, the 
current approach is to assume that all transistor devices 
behave in a similar manner. This assumption, whilst 
greatly simplifying the task of circuit designers, is no 
longer valid on these nanometer scales, since the 
variation in the number and distribution of dopant 
atoms within each macroscopically similar transistor 
makes each one microscopically different, which 
introduces significant differences from device to 
device [3-5]. In the presence of such intrinsic 
parameter fluctuations, the emphasis has shifted from 
predicting the characteristics of a single transistor to 
predicting the statistical behaviour of ensembles of 
macroscopically identical but microscopically different 
devices. This requires very large number of ab-initio 
simulation of ensembles of devices capturing both the 
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atomic and electronic structure. These simulations can 
then be used to understand and predict the behaviour of 
circuits and systems comprising billions of devices 
where small variations in the behaviour of individual 
transistors can have a huge impact upon circuits they 
comprise. Fault tolerance, power consumption and 
yield are just some of the aspects of circuit design that 
are impacted by variability of transistors. 
Understanding the trade-offs in design and the impact 
of transistor device variability is key to the future of 
the semiconductor industry, especially in 
understanding the constraints and tolerances imposed 
by device technologies on the entire design process. 
The EPSRC Pilot Project Meeting the Design 
Challenges of nanoCMOS Electronics 
(www.nanocmos.ac.uk) began in October 2006 and has 
been funded to explore and develop Grid based 
solutions addressing the research challenges inherent in 
this space. However, this is not solely a high-
performance computing project. Given the potentially 
huge commercial impact of this work (the 
semiconductor industry is a multi-trillion dollar 
enterprise), the need for protection of intellectual 
property (IP) is essential, since numerous major 
commercial semiconductor partners are directly 
involved in the project. This IP protection must apply 
to the commercial software tools used and the whole 
process of design and analysis. Within this context, it 
is therefore paramount that fine-grained security is 
supported across the entire collaboration. There are 
many authentication and authorisation based 
approaches that the e-Science and security 
communities have developed. In this paper, we present 
a selection of such technologies that are being explored 
and integrated for nanoCMOS researchers including 
Kerberos [6], X.509-based PKI solutions [7], VOMS 
[8], PERMIS [9] and the Internet2 Shibboleth 
technology [10]. We describe how we have applied 
these solutions and show how they can interoperate to 
support user-oriented single sign-on and seamless, 
secure access to the services and data sets demanded 
by the commercially sensitive nanoCMOS research 
domain.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the processes, 
services and associated data sets that typify the 
electronic design process, and introduces the overall 
architecture of the nanoCMOS infrastructure focusing 
especially on those aspects that require security. 
Section 3 introduces the various authentication and 
authorisation technologies used and outlines their 
primary features. Section 4 outlines key scenarios 
demonstrating how we have integrated 
implementations of these security solutions exploiting 
novel Grid security interoperability standards. Finally, 
in section 5, we conclude on our experiences in 
applying these security solutions and provide a 
summary of our plans for the future. 
 
2. NanoCMOS Security Requirements 
 
The overall sets of services and data associated with 
nanoCMOS research can be classified into several core 
business-oriented areas – all of which have their own 
explicit demands for security. These broadly break 
down into process simulation; device simulation; 
compact model extraction and circuit and system 
simulation and timing and power extraction as depicted 
in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualisation of the nanoCMOS 
Services, Data and Design Processes 
 
2.1 Process Simulation 
 
Process simulation is concerned with the physical steps 
necessary to turn a bare piece of silicon into a working 
semiconductor device. This includes dopant 
implantation information, oxide growth, etching, 
deposition of metals, etc. This information, which is 
commercially sensitive, is typically supplied by a 
semiconductor foundry, such as IBM or TSMC, in a 
technology interchange (.tif) file. 
 
2.2 Device Simulation 
 
Device simulation involves the solution of sets of 
coupled quantum mechanical/drift diffusion equations 
describing the distribution and flow of electrons in a 
given device structure. The inputs to a device 
simulation include information from the process 
simulation, i.e. the provided .tif file containing the 
doping profile for this device and further input files 
including the simulation mesh used as the basis for the 
device simulation. Statistically relevant ensembles of 
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device simulations need to be run to characterise the 
behaviour of a particular device. Each of these will 
have different distribution of individual dopant atoms 
caused by the stochastic nature of implantation 
mechanisms.  
The output of a device simulation is typically a 
current/voltage (I/V) curve describing the 
characteristics of a device with a particular dopant 
profile. The ensemble device simulation process 
generates hundreds of thousands of such I/V curves as 
well as other output. Knowing the I/V characteristics of 
a given device architecture is also sensitive information 
for a semiconductor manufacturer since this 
information is crucial to understanding the power 
consumption and performance of the next generation 
devices. We note that the device simulations 
themselves are extremely computationally intensive 
and generate copious amounts of file-based data. 
Device modellers thus need to be able to maintain fine-
grained access control in terms of where jobs are 
executed and who is allowed access to the resultant 
data sets 
 
2.3 Compact Model Extraction 
 
Having generated the set of I/V curves for a particular 
device, it is necessary to abstract this information to a 
higher level so that multi-device circuit/system 
simulations can be performed. Compact models are 
semi-empirical analytical descriptions of the response 
of a device. A compact model is generated through 
identification of an extraction strategy (identifying the 
subset of device model parameters which most 
influence the curves) and exploitation of commercial 
tools. This phase typically requires domain knowledge 
and expertise in identifying the particular parameters 
that most influence the generated I/V curves. The 
compact models resulting from this process are used by 
circuit and system designers in the design of chips, 
circuits and associated subcomponents such as 
registers, arithmetic logic units, etc. 
 
2.4 Circuit and System Simulation 
 
Once compact models have been generated they can be 
used by circuit simulators to predict the behaviour of 
circuits and systems built from multiple combinations 
of these compact models. Typical examples of the 
kinds of behaviour analysed at the circuit/system level 
with these compact models are to identify how the set 
of connected components respond to a stepped input 
voltages or to explore particular tolerances of the 
integrated circuit. Of course, circuits and systems are 
themselves commercially sensitive. Similarly, 
commercial (licensed) applications are often used for 
circuit simulation.  Feedback from circuit simulation 
may require modifications to the generated compact 
models, which in turn may require device simulations 
to be redone.   
Seamless linkage of each of these processes is 
essential to the understanding of how atomistic 
variation of devices impacts upon system level design 
and profitability. Given that each of these steps also 
has commercially sensitive IP/license protected 
processes which need to be addressed, the overall 
framework that has been adopted in nanoCMOS is 
based upon the definition of and support for fine-
grained security protocols. It is important to note that it 
is unlikely that a single person, institution or industrial 
partner will have access to all of the information 
associated with all of the steps. Rather, each 
stakeholder needs to have their own access and usage 
policies in the overall security framework. We note 
also that this security is driven by non-disclosure 
agreements, which partners must agree to be bound by 
before dealing with IP protected designs and data sets. 
 
3 Authentication and Authorisation 
Technologies 
 
There are many authentication and authorization 
infrastructures existing today. Username/password 
challenge responses are perhaps the simplest and most 
widely adopted authentication solution. One key 
characteristic of Grid based infrastructures that is 
essential for nanoCMOS research, is the support for 
single sign-on. That is, once authenticated, the user is 
allowed access to a range of resources across many 
sites without further re-authentication 
challenge/responses. To support this, the most 
commonly adopted model for Grid based 
authentication is based upon public key infrastructures 
(PKI) [11].  
 
3.1 X.509-based PKIs 
 
In PKIs, certificates are used to bind the identity of a 
user to their public key. These certificates are typically 
based on X.509 standard [12] and are issued by trusted 
third parties known as certification authorities (CAs). 
Through trusting a CA and the procedures they adopt 
for issuing and revoking an individual’s certificates, 
sites can validate the identity of the individual in 
possession of the corresponding private key. This PKI 
based approach has been adopted in the UK 
(www.grid-support.ac.uk/ca) with a single centralised 
CA and a direct trust chain to users, via subordinate 
CAs it controls.  
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Once allocated, X.509 certificates are often used in 
the Grid environment through the creation and use of 
GSI-proxy certificates (proxy certificates). A proxy 
certificate is a delegated credential which represents 
the identity of the entity to whom the X.509 certificate 
belongs: a new set of private and public keys are 
generated and the proxy certificate is signed by the 
private key corresponding to the certificate that is 
delegated. This operation is done using tools such as 
grid-proxy-init, part of the Globus Toolkit [13]. Since 
the private keys of proxy certificates are usually not 
protected, the life time of such a certificate is usually 
short, of the order of 12 hours; this reduces the risks of 
compromising its private material, which could happen 
if the remote machine on which the delegation has 
happened was compromised (or not trusted). Many 
systems that accept proxy certificates for 
authentication also have the ability to generate another 
proxy certificate from them, thus increasing the degree 
of delegation, if permitted by the policy. Once a proxy 
certificate is created, a user is able to access remote 
resources from other remote resources, across a range 
of sites which recognise the CA that issued the original 
X.509 certificate, accept proxy certificates, and where 
that user has a local account registered. This account 
registration, which is a simple authorization method, is 
commonly achieved with middleware such as Globus, 
through gridmap files which map the distinguished 
name (DN) of a certificate to a local user account. As 
discussed in [14-16], there are many limitations 
associated with this model of authorisation and access 
control. Furthermore, such a close association between 
identity management and authorisation can be a 
problem when the status of the user changes. 
 
3.2 Internet2 Shibboleth 
 
To overcome the issues with the identity management 
of X.509 based certificates, UK academia has been 
exploring the roll-out of the Internet2 Shibboleth 
technologies for federated access management. The 
UK Federation (http://www.ukfederation.org.uk) was 
established in November 2006. The basic model of 
access control is based upon trust relationships 
between identity providers (IdPs), who authenticate 
their own users and service providers (SPs), who 
provide resources that can be accessed by users from 
trusted IdPs. Shibboleth is a web-based technology, 
where IdPs and SPs are websites. In the simplest 
model, a user attempting to access a Shibboleth 
protected SP is redirected to a “Where Are You From 
Service” hosted by the federation and asked to select 
their home institution. Once selected, they are 
redirected and asked to log in at their home institution. 
Each institution is free to have whatever local 
authentication system they wish. Once a user has 
successfully authenticated, a Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) [17] assertion is returned 
to the SP which uses this information to make its own 
autonomous access control decision.  
This model depends upon two key components. 
Firstly, the underlying trust relationship that exists 
between IdPs and SPs in the federation, which is 
enforced by a PKI. Secondly, this model is based upon 
standardisation of the attributes that are being 
exchanged. The UK federation is based on a small core 
set of attributes based around the eduPerson schema 
[18]. These attributes allow the description of which 
institution a user is from and their role at that 
institution, e.g. lecturer at Glasgow University.  
 In the context of the nanoCMOS project, the SP 
that has been established is based upon a Grid portal. 
This portal allows access to a range of services and 
data sets associated with device modelling, compact 
model generation and circuit simulation. More 
information on these services is available in [19-21]. 
We note that software support for scoping of the trust 
relationships associated with IdPs in the UK 
Federation exists and is described in [22]. The linkage 
between SAML assertions and Grid-based X.509 
certificates is being addressed by numerous projects 
including ShibGrid, SHEBANGS and their follow on 
project SARoNGS [23]. Within the nanoCMOS portal, 
this linkage is supported through support of proxy 
credential repositories accessible through the project 
portal. Thus end users authenticate via Shibboleth to 
the portal and are then able to create proxy credentials 
through a portal interface to a MyProxy service [24]. 
Whilst Shibboleth overcomes identity management 
issues and simplifies access to resources (through not 
demanding that end users acquire and manage their 
own X.509 certificates), it does not in itself address the 
finer-grained security needs of nanoCMOS. Thus the 
core eduPerson attributes that are defined in the UK 
Federation must be extended to support the specific 
needs of nanoCMOS collaborators, for nanoCMOS-
specific access control authorisation decisions. As 
described in [25] there are several ways in which 
supplied attributes can be defined and used for 
authorisation decisions. The decentralised model (as is 
the case with Shibboleth and multiple independent 
IdPs) and the centralised model as reflected with the 
Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS) 
[8]. 
 
3.3 VOMS  
 
VOMS has gained widespread acceptance across the 
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Grid community due to the relatively simple model for 
defining the roles specific to a particular virtual 
organisation and how they can be used/enforced by 
sites, and through being designed specifically to be 
compliant with existing X.509 based Grid 
authentication approaches. VOMS is based upon a 
centralised server where roles are agreed across a given 
collaboration. Once defined, sites are responsible for 
configuring their resources to use these roles where the 
typical resources protected with VOMS are pooled 
accounts on HPC-oriented compute clusters. This is 
often implemented by local administrators through 
tools such as Local Centre Authorization Service 
(LCAS) and the Local Credential Mapping Service 
(LCMAPS) [26]. These tools map the user role 
information into group identities (gid), user identities 
(uid) on associated pool accounts established on the 
local cluster for that particular virtual organisation. 
Typically these accounts are set up and configured 
with software specific to the particular end users of that 
virtual organisation. This overcomes one of the main 
limitations of grid mapfiles which are established on a 
per user basis. 
The VOMS model assumes a centralised 
administrator responsible for assigning roles to 
individuals. Once assigned, VOMS tools allow for 
creation of proxy certificates which embed the roles a 
particular user has. For VOMS-enabled resources, 
these attributes are used to make local access control 
decisions and if successful will map end users to 
appropriate pooled accounts with associated uid/gid’s. 
For sites that are not VOMS-enabled, the proxy 
certificates are used as normal X.509 proxy 
certificates, i.e. the embedded VOMS credentials are 
ignored. 
It is important to note that collaborating sites may 
use VOMS information at their own discretion. 
 
3.4 PERMIS  
 
The Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure 
Standards Validation (PERMIS) project 
(www.permis.org) was an EU funded project that built 
an authorisation infrastructure to realise a scalable, 
X.509 attribute certificate (AC) [27] based privilege 
management infrastructure. 
The PERMIS software realises a Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC) authorisation infrastructure 
and offers a standards-based application interface that 
allows developers of resource gateways (gatekeepers) 
to enquire if access to a particular resource should be 
allowed. The PERMIS RBAC system supports the 
definition of policies comprised of rules specifying 
which access control decisions are to be made for 
given resources. These rules can include definitions of: 
subjects that can be assigned roles; sources of authority 
(SoA), e.g. local managers trusted to assign roles to 
subjects; roles and their hierarchical relationships; 
what roles can be assigned to which subjects by which 
SoAs; target resources, and the actions that can be 
applied to them; which roles are allowed to perform 
certain actions on certain targets, and the conditions 
under which access can be granted to roles. A typical 
PERMIS scenario is to define rules of the form “Can 
this person with this role access this resource and 
perform the following action”. 
Roles are assigned to subjects by issuing them 
with X.509 ACs. Policies can then be defined, digitally 
signed by a manager and stored in one or more LDAP 
repositories that used these ACs to make access control 
decisions.  
One of the primary benefits that PERMIS 
provides for the nanoCMOS project is its alignment 
with the Grid middleware and standards community 
more generally. PERMIS is currently integrated with 
Globus and the Open Middleware Infrastructure 
Institute (OMII-UK www.omii.ac.uk) software stack. 
Typical scenarios using PERMIS and middleware such 
as Globus include support for SAML callouts that are 
automatically raised by a policy enforcement point 
(PEP) and passed to a PERMIS based policy decision 
point (PDP) when a Grid service is to be invoked as 
discussed in [28]. More recently, standards for pushing 
and pulling attribute certificates between various 
attribute authorities now exist and are now supported 
by PERMIS as discussed in section 4.  
 
3.5 Kerberos 
 
Andrew File System (AFS) [29] is a distributed 
networked file-system which uses a set of trusted 
servers to present a homogeneous, location-transparent 
file namespace to clients. Through AFS, a user can log 
on and securely access a virtual file space crossing 
multiple heterogeneous resources. To support both 
structuring and security of this file space, AFS uses 
organizational units called cells. A cell can be 
considered as the collection of all the files belonging to 
an organisational unit. Each server, as might be 
expected, hosts a collection of files and makes them 
accessible throughout the cell. Each client allows 
access to the files hosted by the various servers. 
Underpinning the security of cells and hence AFS is 
the Kerberos security infrastructure [30].  
Kerberos uses a central ticket issuing authority - a 
Key Distribution Center (KDC). Like public key based 
systems, principals are identified by a name and realm 
in the form name@REALM. Realms are approximately 
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synonymous with the domain the entities are hosted in.  
 
Through use of AFS clients, nanoCMOS 
researchers are able to access and share data sets 
securely using Kerberos tickets. Each AFS directory 
has an associated access control list (ACL). Individual 
files do not have their own ACLs. Subdirectories 
inherit the ACL of their parent directory unless 
explicitly given an ACL of their own. ACLs are 
typically administered by a directory's owner and/or 
local system administrators. An ACL comprises a list 
of entries prescribing who can access the directory and 
its contents and with what permissions. Each entry 
comprises a user or group and the permissions granted 
to that user or group. Groups are a collection of one or 
more named users. Users are able to create new groups, 
remove groups and to add individual users to groups, 
as well as the permissions they have, e.g. to create 
subdirectories, read and/or edit files etc. 
AFS and its strong security mechanisms offer 
many features which make it well aligned with the 
requirements of the nanoCMOS project. Firstly, it 
offers a mechanism to manage large quantities of 
highly distributed files as generated from device 
modeling simulations and direct access as a file-
system. Secondly the fine-grained security-oriented 
access permissions on these directories and files allow 
collaborators to share their data sets on a per 
user/group basis as required.  However, it is essential 
that the multiple different security solutions identified 
here are aligned and interoperate to ensure the 
complete end-end security of the nanoCMOS 
infrastructure. In the next section we show through a 
variety of scenarios how this interoperability is 
currently being supported. 
 
4. nanoCMOS Security Case Studies 
 
The ideal scenario for nanoCMOS research is to have 
fine-grained end-to-end security across all resources 
for all partners involved in the nanoCMOS project. 
This should protect access to services, data, and 
designs on an as needs basis. At the time of writing we 
are working on the complete integration of all of these 
solutions, however we have implemented a variety of 
interoperability scenarios between security solutions 
which we describe.  
 
4.1 Integration of Shibboleth and PERMIS for 
Portal Configuration 
 
To improve the usability and uptake of Shibboleth 
technology in Grid environments it is necessary to 
securely extend the attributes supplied by the UK 
Federation with attributes applicable to the 
requirements of specific virtual organizations. The 
SPAM-GP project 
(www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/spam-gp) was proposed 
to provide a set of portlets to support the process of 
establishing and enforcing, fine grained Grid security 
in a Shibboleth environment. Specifically the project is 
developing a family of JSR-168 compliant portlets, 
with which a Grid portal administrator can tailor access 
to the resources available behind the portal, i.e. the 
Grid services which themselves have authorization 
requirements that need to be met. These include 
portlets for the scoping of attribute acceptance policies 
(the Scoped Attribute Management Portlet - SCAMP); 
security-oriented content configuration of portals 
(CCP) and for the creation and use of attribute 
certificates (ACP) as required for potentially remote 
service authorization.  
The SCAMP portlet allows restricted and 
syntactically correct manipulation of the attribute 
acceptance policy of a Shibboleth SP to streamline the 
subset of IdPs from whom a portal will accept user 
attributes. Thus rather than accepting all IdPs in the 
UK Federation, nanoCMOS only wishes to accept 
attributes from those involved in the actual 
collaboration itself. To support this, the SCAMP 
portlet parses the federation metadata associated with 
the SP for the list of all the IdPs within the federation, 
and stores the values of the ‘scope’ entry for each IdP.  
When the SP is provided with a scoped attribute, the 
suffix will by definition be one of these scoped values. 
The list of IdP scopes in the federation is provided to 
the user/portal administrator in the form of a drop 
down list, one per user attribute, where the institutions 
from whom attributes are to be recognized/accepted 
from may be selected. Once the required sites are 
selected, these changes can then be added to the 
attribute acceptance file. This policy information will 
then subsequently be available for the next browser 
session referencing that resource, i.e. only allowing 
access to the resources from known and trusted sites 
with expected attributes. Figure 2 illustrates the 
application of the SCAMP portlet. The front end 
access to the portal is depicted at the bottom of Figure 
2 below. We note that this portal displays the various 
attributes (roles) that have been released by the identity 
provider and attribute authority at the University of 
Glasgow. We note that in this case, the only attributes 
that are recognised by the portal are those prefixed 
with NanoCMOS from the trusted (scoped) University 
of Glasgow IdP. For illustrative purposes, the top part 
of Figure 2 shows another Shibboleth protected portal 
but this time without scoping of attributes. 
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Figure 2. NanoCMOS Portal with Attribute 
Scoping (below) and Other Portal without 
Attribute Scoping (above) 
 
This scoping allows the portal to be restricted to only 
accept attributes from known and trusted sources, e.g. 
the nanoCMOS partner sites or only from specific 
individuals at those sites. The attributes themselves are 
then used to restrict access to the associated services 
available within the portal. To support this, the CCP 
portlet is used by the portal/nanoCMOS administrator 
to enforce access control decisions on the interfaces to 
the services and data sets themselves (portlets). Thus, 
an individual with a given set of roles or licenses 
should only be able to see the interfaces to those 
services that their privileges allow. To support this, the 
GridSphere portal framework has been extended with 
capabilities for user /virtual organization defined roles. 
These roles are then used to render the appropriate 
interfaces (portlets) to the user.  
The ACP portlet provides a mechanism which 
addresses the need for site autonomy. It is highly 
unlikely that access control decisions to nanoCMOS 
resources will be left up to a potentially remote portal 
managed at Glasgow University. Instead, sites must 
make their own decisions on access to, and usage of, 
their own resources. To facilitate this, the ACP creates 
attribute certificates using the role information 
provided by Shibboleth and signs and stores them in an 
LDAP server associated with the portal. Remote 
services that wish to make their own local 
authorisation decisions can then be configured to use 
pull these attribute certificates in order to ensure that 
the user is authorized to access and use that remote 
service. The attributes themselves are signed by the 
virtual organization and agreed a priori, i.e. a remote 
service provider must provide the necessary 
information (roles required etc) for these attributes to 
be created on the fly by the ACP. Once defined, the use 
of these attributes in making authorization decisions is 
entirely transparent to the end user. 
 
4.2 Integration of VOMS and PERMIS for 
Security-oriented Job Submission 
 
In the development of the required Grid infrastructure 
the project has utilised many of the technologies 
provided by OMII-UK. The early phase of work has 
focused upon development of a family of OMII-UK 
services, which support the device modelling and 
compact model generation phases of electronics 
design. These services have been developed to exploit 
the OMII-UK GridSAM job submission system.  
The aim of GridSAM is to provide a web service 
for submitting and monitoring jobs managed by a 
variety of Distributed Resource Managers (DRM). 
This web service interface allows jobs to be submitted 
from a client in a Job Submission Description 
Language (JSDL) document and supports their status 
retrieval as a chronological list of events detailing the 
state of the job. GridSAM translates the submission 
instruction into a set of resource-specific actions: file 
staging, launching and monitoring using DRM 
connectors for each stage. A variety of resource 
specific DRM connectors are available including 
connectors for Condor, Sun Grid Engine and Globus. 
The work is currently focused on supporting the 
Globus DRM connector for the 
GRAMSubmissionStage part of the DRM connector 
sequence. Here, authorisation is decided before the 
JSDL document is submitted to the GridSAM instance 
and converted to a Globus specific Resource 
Specification Language document and submitted to a 
GRAM manager. This is achieved through extraction 
of the VOMS attributes from the GridSAM invocation 
(themselves embedded in the JSDL document) and 
using these to authorise access to specific connectors.  
In order to support VOMS integration within the 
nanoCMOS domain, a nanoCMOS virtual organisation 
was established in a VOMS server at the National e-
Science Centre in Glasgow. In this, the key roles of 
deviceModeller and circuitSimulator were established. 
These roles have been used within vanilla VOMS 
scenarios to map end users within the nanoCMOS 
domain to appropriate pooled accounts and gids/uids 
for the nanoCMOS project on the ScotGrid 
(www.scotgrid.ac.uk) resource at Glasgow.  
Where necessary the adoption of hybrid approaches 
to attribute authorities, i.e. use VOMS but if further 
information is required by a PEP/PDP then pull the 
other information from one or more trusted authorities. 
It should be noted that with recent Grid authorization 
standardization efforts, the above architecture can 
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function equally well in a pull mode. For example, 
rather than the end user embedding the VOMS AC in 
their proxy certificate, it is equally possible for them to 
simply use an X.509 proxy certificate and have the 
service pull the needed (VOMS) attributes required to 
make authorization decision. Within the nanoCMOS 
project we expect to work with both of these scenarios 
as required. 
 
4.3 Integration of X.509 Certificates and 
Kerberos 
 
Access to AFS is through AFS tokens, typically 
obtained via Kerberos. However, many Grid based 
infrastructures such as ScotGrid and the UK National 
Grid Service exploit Globus middleware and its use of 
X.509 based PKIs. As a consequence, such systems 
and their associated gatekeepers do not directly support 
such tokens. We note that most cluster based systems 
do not propagate tokens from cluster head nodes to 
worker nodes anyway.  To work around this, we have 
adopted the gssklog application [31]. gssklog is able to 
take an X.509 based proxy certificate and authenticate 
with a gssklogd server. The gssklogd server is then able 
to return appropriate AFS tokens. 
The typical scenario explored in nanoCMOS for 
integrating X.509 certificates and Kerberos is as 
follows. The user creates an X.509 proxy credential 
either directly on their client machine or through the 
Shibboleth enabled portal and the MyProxy service 
that is offered there. Using this proxy credential, the 
user is able to select input files and simulations that 
they wish to run on compute clusters such as the AFS-
enabled ScotGrid resource. When these jobs are 
submitted, the associated gatekeeper invokes the 
gssklog application to obtain the appropriate AFS 
tokens and the job is submitted and data staged to the 
appropriate AFS directories upon job completion.  
One of the benefits of this model of job submission 
is that since we are working with a global file system, 
the notion of file staging to and from the cluster is 
moot. That is, the virtual directories can be considered 
as local to the AFS enabled cluster even when 
potentially remote.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The challenges facing nanoCMOS electronics research 
demand that fine-grained security is supported, in order 
to address the myriad IP constraints associated with the 
commercial domain. We recognize that no single 
security solution meets all nanoCMOS needs: X.509 
certificates have known limitations but are widely 
accepted as the way to authenticate for access and use 
Grid resources; VOMS attribute authorities are well 
recognized for defining the roles applicable across 
virtual organizations but have their own limitations; 
PERMIS provides fine grained service-level security 
but is not well matched to distributed file systems; 
Shibboleth provides simple user-oriented access to 
resources, whilst Kerberos underpins technologies such 
as AFS to provide secure access to federated file based 
data. This work is still very much in progress however 
many of the issues in integrating these multi-security 
solutions are being addressed both within the standards 
community and through early adopters such as the 
nanoCMOS project. 
That said, we are acutely aware that the best 
security solution is often the simplest. The complexity 
of many of these solutions is a continuous source for 
concern both for us and importantly for establishing 
trust with our commercial partners. To address this we 
continue to embrace simple solutions for access control 
and management. Thus rather than attempting to deal 
with secure enclaves on shared public resources such 
as the National Grid Service, we are often taking more 
pragmatic solutions such as only allowing Intellectual 
Property-oriented jobs to execute on local resources. 
This has the advantage of overcoming security 
concerns but does of course mean that less compute 
facilities are often available. Such pragmatic 
considerations incorporating any associated risks are 
continuously being monitored and assessed in 
delivering the nanoCMOS infrastructure. 
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